This paper combines a literature overview of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics, with new models that fill some voids in the literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibrium-refinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of pragmatic inference.
Introduction
According to Grice (1957) , what is said by means of a sentence depends not only on the speaker, but also on the hearer: the latter has to recognize the communicative intentions of the former. It is well established, moreover, that a speaker in a typical conversational situation communicates more by the use of a sentence than just what she explicitly said. What is said is enriched with what is conversationally implicated by the use of a sentence. In pragmaticsthe study of language use -it is standard to assume that the enrichment of conventional meaning with what is implicated is possible because speakers conform to Grice's (1967) Cooperative Principle: the assumption that speakers are maximally efficient, rational language users. It seems crucial then for successful communication that the hearer recognizes the speaker's intentions, that the speaker recognizes that the hearer recognizes the speaker's intentions, that the hearer recognizes that the speaker recognizes that the hearer recognizes… etc. Given the requirement of such interactive reasoning, a game-theoretical framework seems natural to account both for what is said, and for what is implicated. In view of this, gametheoretic pragmatics has become an integral part of the field of pragmatics: for overviews, see Benz et al. (2006) , , Franke (2008), and Jäger (2011) . Given Grice's Cooperative Principle, sender-receiver games where sender and receiver have common interests over the actions which the receiver takes in each state of the world, are a natural object to study in pragmatics. Yet, game-theoretic signaling literature instead pays a lot of attention to conflicts of interest between sender and receiver, creating a gap between game-theoretic pragmatics and signaling literature, and limiting the interaction between the two fields. This is unfortunate, as signaling literature treats a much wider range of models than have so far been treated in game-theoretic pragmatics. For signaling literature, the gap is unfortunate because it cuts the literature off from the concrete applications provided by pragmatics.
A first purpose of our paper is to review conflict-of-interest signaling games, and to draw inspiration from this literature to complete what we consider to be some missing parts in game-theoretic pragmatics. In the literature on conflict-of-interest signaling games, we distinguish between models of direct signaling (= information revelation), costly signaling, noisy signaling and imprecise signaling. The common theme in these models is that an informed sender is biased towards an uninformed receiver taking a certain action. If it happens to be the case now that taking the sender's favored action is also in the receiver's interests, can the sender credibly signal this, and if so, how? The literature shows that informative equilibria exist where the sender is able to credibly signal that the receiver should take the sender's favorite action by sending a message which a sender who observes that it is not in the receiver's interest to take this action, would never want to send. The most wellknown instance of this is costly signaling: a sender who wants to signal that she is rich may credibly do this by lighting a cigar with a $100 bill. The literature we review shows that credible signaling can also take place by revealing information that dishonest senders would never be able to reveal (direct signaling), or by sending a message that is so noisy or so imprecise that such a dishonest sender would never want to send it. Yet, at the same time uninformative equilibria exist where sender and receiver keep each other locked in a situation where the receiver believes that the sender's messages can never be credible, leading the sender never to send any messages, thereby not disproving the receiver's beliefs. In terms of the example above, money burning would then never convince the receiver. Given the existence of multiple equilibria, a central theme in the literature therefore is to find equilibrium selection arguments, of which we review the key ones, which eliminate equilibria detrimental to both players. The common thread of these arguments is that if a receiver who considers that an uninformative equilibrium could have been played, still receives a message from the sender (e.g., the burning of a $100 bill), then this receiver should reason about the sender's incentives for sending such a message, and should then conclude that this particular message could only have been sent by a particular sender. These same arguments are used to try and eliminate informative equilibria where the sender is using a message that is more costly, noisy or imprecise than is necessary to make signaling credible (e.g in terms of the money burning example, the burning of a $500 bill).
We next go on to look whether game-theoretic pragmatics contains common-interest versions of the direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signaling models from the signaling literature. We review the common-interest direct and costly signaling models that have already been treated in game-theoretic pragmatics, and introduce common-interest versions of the noisy and imprecise signaling models from the conflict-of-interest signaling literature. In these common-interest games, rather than the sender strategically not revealing information, or strategically making signals costly, noisy or imprecise, it is inherently impossible for the sender to reveal all information, or to makes signals completely costless, noiseless or precise. It is in the interest of the sender and in case of direct, noisy and imprecise signaling also in the interest of the receiver, to minimize as much as possible the costs of these imperfections, thus to use the limited information that can be revealed in the best possible way, and to relegate the sending of more costly, noisy or imprecise messages to states of the world where the impact of these imperfections is as limited as possible. The typical example of this in pragmatics is Horn's division of pragmatic labor (Horn (1984) , also known as the iconicity principle), where costs are saved by reserving the sending of costly (= marked, or disambiguating) messages for less frequent states of the world, so that these costs are incurred as infrequently as possible. Yet, both informative equilibria exist where players do and do not act in such a cost-efficient way; in terms of the costly signaling example, sender and receiver can also coordinate on a separating equilibrium where the costly messages are used in the more frequent states. Further, in spite of sender and receiver having common interests, it continues to be the case that their mutual beliefs can lock them into uninformative equilibria, just as is the case in signaling games with a conflict of interest.
We apply the same equilibrium selection arguments treated in the conflict-of-interest signaling literature to investigate whether the players can escape the uninformative equilibria and the cost-inefficient informative equilibria. As we show, the equilibrium selection arguments can eliminate the uninformative equilibria, but not the cost-inefficient informative equilibria. Intuitively, in the case of costly signaling, the sending of costly messages in infrequent states rather than frequent ones requires a complete reversal of the way in which messages are used. For this reason, we provide extensions to the equilibrium selection arguments, where the uninformative equilibrium, or what would be done in an uninformative equilibrium, is always taken as a starting point. Intuitively, consider the simplest possible case where there is an infrequent state of the world and a frequent one, and a single costly message. In the uninformative equilibrium, in the absence of signaling, the receiver's best guess is that the frequent state of the world occurs. We argue then that the receiver who receives a costly message should reason that the sender wants the receiver to deviate from what would be done in the uninformative equilibrium, and intends the receiver to guess that the infrequent state occurs. For this reason, only the cost-efficient informative equilibrium survives.
A second purpose of our paper is to provide a unified, game-theoretical pragmatic treatment of both conflict-of-interest signaling games and common-interest games. 1 We regard conflict as an integral part of conversational situations, and argue that conversational implicatures take place whether or not sender and receiver have common interests. Thus, the conflict-of-interest games we review are not only to be seen as a source of inspiration for analogous commoninterest games, but can be integrated into the field of game-theoretic pragmatics. This is, first, because the conflict-of-interest signaling games we treat are not zero-sum games (i.e. games where players have diametrically opposed interests). Because of this, in spite of the conflict of interest, both sender and receiver may be better off with an informative than with an uninformative equilibrium, so that from this perspective the Cooperative Principle continues to be relevant. Second, if the conflict of interest is more severe, so that e.g. the sender prefers an uninformative equilibrium while the receiver prefers an informative equilibrium, the conversational implicature resulting from what is said by the sender may simply clarify that the sender does not want to be informative.
A third purpose of our paper is to emphasize the importance of context in conversational implicatures (cf. e.g. De Jaegher and Van Rooij (20011) ), where this context is formalized here by the details of the signaling game, such as the type of signaling (direct, costly, noisy or imprecise) and the payoffs of the players (in particular, whether or not there is a conflict of interests, and further the form of the uninformative equilibrium). Grice (1967) translates the Cooperative Principle in maxims to be followed in conversation, which suggests that these maxims are universal. While in several of the games we treat, equilibrium selection arguments formalize Grice's maxims, in other games they do not. As an example, consider Grice's Maxim of Manner, formalized by Horn's division of pragmatic labor. As already mentioned this rule says that disambiguation should only take place in infrequent states. In the context of common interest costly-signaling games, where disambiguating is considered to result in more costly messages, this makes sense: sending costly, disambiguating messages only in infrequent states saves costs. Yet, consider instead a context where messages are sometimes misunderstood, and where a more ambiguous message is more often misunderstood. Then if there is a conflict of interest, deliberately seeking ambiguity, and flouting the Maxim of Manner, may make signaling credible. Further, in common-interest signaling games, if ambiguity of a message is interpreted as the fact that the message is sometimes misunderstood, then ambiguous messages should be only be sent in infrequent states, as the impact of mistakes is smaller there. So, in this case, contrary to what is stated above, disambiguation should take place in frequent states. While Gricean pragmatics allows for the explicit flouting of the maxims in order to encourage conversational implicatures (such as in the case of irony or sarcasm), these examples illustrate that it is not clear whether there are universal maxims. Rather, the Cooperative Principle leads to ad hoc conversational implicatures, depending on the context.
A fourth and final purpose of our paper is to challenge whether conversational implicatures necessarily leads to informative equilibria and/or to efficiency. For conflict of interest games, if in an uninformative equilibrium, the biased sender gets her favorite response from the sender, then there is no reason why the sender would be informative. The receiver could threaten to interpret the absence of information to the sender's disadvantage, but such a threat is not credible. Rather, the receiver infers that the sender is not informative because the sender has no reason to be informative. This cannot be said to lead to inefficiency, because playing the uninformative equilibrium is still in the sender's interests. Yet, the claim that pragmatic inference does not necessarily lead to play of (particular) informative equilibria applies even to common interest games, where such informative equilibria are better for both receiver and sender. To illustrate this, consider again a simple common-interest costly signaling game with two states of the world, namely a frequent one and an infrequent one. Then, if wrongly guessing the frequent state is very costly to the receiver, in the uninformative equilibrium, he will still act as if the infrequent state occurs. Given this fact, following the reasoning of our equilibrium selection arguments, a receiver who receives a costly message should interpret this as having been sent in the frequent state, leading to play of the cost-inefficient informative equilibrium which violates Horn's division of pragmatic labor. In similar variants of our noisy and imprecise common interest signaling games, our equilibrium selection arguments predict play of cost-inefficient equilibria, where the sender is noisy/imprecise in states of the world where this has the largest impact. This suggests that conversational implicature need not lead to efficiency, even if sender and receiver have common interests. Thus, our analysis accounts for inefficiencies in language use.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents, in general terms, the simple signaling game that is used throughout this paper. The concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is introduced, along with several equilibrium selection arguments that have the potential of eliminating some PBEs when a game has several PBEs. These equilibrium selection arguments are linked to Gricean maxims where possible. Assuming that there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver over the action that the receiver should take in each state of the world (in short: conflict-of-interest signaling games), Section 3 treats direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signaling. Section 4 does the same for games where sender and receiver agree on what is the action that the receiver should take in each state of the world (in short: common-interest signaling games 2 ). Each model is introduced by means of a story, and is illustrated by means of a numerical example. We end with a discussion in Section 5.
2 If, as we assume for costly signaling, a cost is incurred by the sender for each message sent, but this cost is not incurred by the receiver, then even if sender and receiver have common interests over the action taken by the receiver, strictly speaking we still have a conflict-of-interest game, because the receiver does not internalize the costs of sending messages. If the cost of sending a message is large, even though sender and receiver have common interests over the action taken by the receiver, it may be that while the separating PBE is best to the receiver, the pooling PBE is best to the sender. Yet, in Section 4, our interest is in small costs of sending a message. For simplicity, we still talk about a costly signaling common-interest game in this case.
Workhorse model and equilibrium selection arguments
At stage 1, Nature chooses a state of the world from a set T of three states } , , { 3 2 1 t t t , with probabilities respectively π 1 , π 2 , π 3 , where 1
. In many of the games considered, we assume that π 3 = 0, in which case there are only two states of the world. At stage 2, after having observed the state of the world, the Sender (S) chooses to send a single message m from a finite set M(t), where this set may differ according to the state of the world t. Any message set M(t) may include the empty message m 0 . At stage 3, depending on the message sent by S, Nature decides with probability µ(m|m) that the Receiver (R) receives S's message, and with probability µ(m 0 |m) that R does not receive the message, where µ(m|m) + µ(m 0 |m) = 1. When S sends m 0 , R always receives m 0 . At stage 4, R chooses an action from a set A of three actions {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. The players' utility functions take the form
It is assumed that ) ,
, so that R's utility in state t does not depend on the message sent. We assume throughout that for all 3 , 2 ,
is the cost of sending a signal m in state t. We assume throughout that 0 ) ,
, we talk of a signaling game with common interests over the actions taken by R. If this inequality is not systematically valid, we talk of a signaling game with a conflict of interest over the actions taken by R.
We talk of direct signaling if M(t) assigns a single message to each state of the world, which is different for each state of the world. We speak of indirect signaling if M(t) = M is identical for each t. In case of indirect signaling, M may contain messages in a common language. In this case, the finite set M is large enough for S to express any event (e.g.: "state 1 or state 2 occurs"). Alternatively, the messages in M may not have any pregiven meaning. A Nash equilibrium of the signaling game is a pair consisting of a signaling strategy (.) * m and of an action strategy (.) * a such that these strategies are mutual best responses. If, whenever possible, the players apply Bayes' rule when determining their best response, we talk of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). As is typically the case for signaling games, our game may have multiple PBE. This can be seen by the fact that, while possibly having separating PBE (the formal term for informative equilibria), signaling games in any case have a pooling PBE (the formal term for uninformative equilibria where R always takes the same action). Simply, if R decides to take the same action a whether or not a message is received, then it is a best response for S not to send any messages; this in turn makes the given strategy of R a best response. R's out-of-equilibrium beliefs about the state of the world observed by a S who sends a particular message are always justifiable, simply because the messages are never observed. A Pareto-efficient PBE is a PBE where it is the case that, ex ante, before players find out the state of the world, it is not possible to give one player a strictly higher expected utility without giving the other player a strictly lower expected utility. There may be a unique Pareto-efficient PBE, which leaves both players as well off as possible, or there may be multiple Pareto-efficient PBE, where some are best for one player, and others are best for the other player.
Given the multiplicity of PBE in the signaling games we consider, we now define a series of equilibrium selection arguments that have in part been defined specifically in the context of signaling games, which then hopefully select Pareto-efficient PBE. We start with a number of equilibrium selection arguments that are rooted in standard game theory. 4 We first look at the sequential equilibrium, which says that if a message m can only be sent in a particular t, then R should always plan to do the action a that is optimal in t when receiving message m, even when m is never received. Given this fact, S should not expect any response different from a when sending m. Definition 1. Sequential equilibrium. Consider a completely mixed strategy of S, so that every message from the set M(t) is sent with positive probability in state t. Consider R's best response to such a strategy, and in particular his best response action a to a particular message m in M(t). If this best response a to m is the same for any of the specified completely mixed strategies by S, then in any sequential equilibrium, R should plan to do a when hearing m, even when m is never received. █
The next equilibrium selection arguments we consider are only relevant for indirect signaling. We start with Farrell's (1993) neologism proofness. Farrell assumes that M consists of messages which express in a common language which event occurs. Whenever in what follows we refer to neologism proofness, we imply that M takes the form of messages from a common language. By assuming such a common language, Farrell is able to separate between the meaning of messages (which is assumed to be pre-given), and the credibility of messages. The crucial assumption concerning credibility is that, if S and R have common interests over R's best action in a state of the world, R should consider the literal meaning of an out-ofequilibrium message as truthful. In particular, consider PBE E*, and consider an out-ofequilibrium message ' ' m (a "neologism"), not sent in E*. Consider the event P expressed by ' ' m , and R's best response a x when P occurs in reality. Consider any states of the world in which S is better off when R adopts response a x rather than the response adopted in PBE E*. If these states of the world are exactly those contained in event P, then E* is not neologism proof.
5
Definition 2 (Farrell, 1993) . Consider PBE E*, and consider an out-of-equilibrium message ' ' m from a set of messages M in a common language, where ' ' m expresses that event P occurs. Let a x be R's best response when event P truly occurs. Denote by m*(.) the message sent in equilibrium as a function of the state of the world, and by (.) * a R's response to a message sent in PBE E*. Then we say that E* is not neologism proof iff : 
:
Farrell (1993) focuses on cheap-talk signaling games, and his main motive for formulating the neologism proofness criterion is to eliminate so-called babbling equilibria. These are pooling PBE where S uses a completely mixed strategy, by using for each state of the world t every single message in M(t) with positive probability, and this in such a manner that messages contain so little information that R always takes the same action.
7
If R always takes the same action, whatever the messages sent by S, given that sending messages is costless, this is a weak best response to S. Farrell argues against babbling equilibria, first, because it is not clear why S would ever mix between every available message, and, second, because in a rich common language, neologisms can always be created.
8
The availability of neologisms is is not an issue in our analysis, because our focus is on the pooling PBE where only the empty message m 0 is sent, following the argument made in the introduction that this is a natural starting point. If this pooling PBE is not neologism proof according to Definition 2, with which separating PBE is the out-of-equilibrium message ' ' m , as specified in Definition 2, compatible? In Definition 3, we define such a separating PBE as being pooling-based neologism proof. It should be noted here that we do not assume that the pooling PBE was necessarily played previously; rather, the reasoning is that R when receiving a message infers S's intentions, given the fact that S could have remained quiet (could have tried to play a pooling PBE).
9
Definition 3. Let set M consist of messages m 0 and non-empty messages ' ' m . Consider a separating PBE E** where ' ' m is sent in event P, and m 0 otherwise. Then this separating PBE is poolingbased neologism proof, if equations (1) and (2) apply to the pooling PBE where m 0 is always sent. █ From a pragmatic perspective, neologism proofness may be seen as analogous to Grice's Maxim of Quality ("Communicate only what you think is true."). The Maxim of Quality as well as the neologism proofness criterion imply that, as S and R have common interests, there is no reason to use messages with a common meaning in an untruthful manner. Following Van Rooij (2008) , the pooling-based neologism-proofness can be likened to Grice's first 6 Note that the response when no message arrives is always the same as in the PBE, as R can then not observe that S has deviated from the PBE. 7 In our simplified model of noise, it is only possible to receive a message or not to receive it. In a more complex model, messages may also be mistaken for one other. In this case, if each message sent can be mistaken for each other message, the neologism proofness criterion cannot be applied, as no out-of-equilibrium messages can be perceived. 8 As pointed out in Matthews et al. (1991, p.254) , while Farrell's assumption is intuitive, it is an extra-theoretical assumption, which is not in line with standard game theory: as long as the message set is countable infinite, a babbling equilibrium where S uses every possible message always exists. 9 More formally, pooling-based neologism proofness (along with the pooling-based intuitive criterion) could be seen as reflecting the rationalizability of an equilibrium, after the computation of iterated best responses (see Franke (2009) and Jäger and Ebert (2009) ). When not receiving a message, let R believe that a pooling PBE is played; this is plausible, as R when not receiving any information may consider himself as not having any information. Then S, knowing R's beliefs, should only send a message when wanting R to do an action different than the one that is done in the pooling PBE. R in turn, putting himself in S's shoes, when receiving a message should infer that S wants him to take another action than in the pooling PBE. Etc.
Maxim of Quantity, Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). This maxim implies that if S wants to communicate to R that he should do the same as he does in the pooling PBE, then it is not necessary to provide more information than is done in the pooling PBE.
The next two equilibrium selection arguments we consider are due to Cho and Kreps (1987) , and are only relevant when players do not share a common language. Whenever we refer to these equilibrium refinements, the assumption is that there is no common language. Whereas neologism proofness only deals with the credibility of signals by considering meaning as pre-given, Cho and Kreps deal both with meaning and credibility, in not considering meaning as being pre-given. Specifically for costly signaling, it may be the case that for some t that can be observed by S, S never wants to send a message ' m , whatever R's response to it. It is reasonable then to assume that R should never interpret ' m as having come from t.
Definition 4 (Cho and Kreps, 1987) . Let
Then we say that for state of the world t, message ' m is dominated by message m.█ From equation (3), it is immediately clear that the dominance only applies to costly signals: with costless signals, the worst payoff that can be obtained by sending message m can never be better than the best payoff obtained by sending message ' m . Rather than checking whether there are certain states of the world for which S would never want to send certain messages, we can also look at whether it is not the case that in certain states, S would never have an incentive to deviate from a particular PBE. This is the idea of the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) . The idea is similar to the one of neologismproofness, except that it is not required now that out-of-equilibrium messages have commonly-known meanings, thus the intuitive criterion both explains how meaning and credibility is established. Suppose that players expect to play PBE E*. It may now be the case that for some t that can be observed by S, whatever the action taken by R, S always does worse by sending message ' m than in E*. Additionally, assume that states of the world other than t exist that do have an incentive to deviate from E*. Then R should interpret such a message ' m as having been sent in such states of the world. The PBE does not meet the intuitive criterion then.
Definition 5. (Cho and Kreps, 1987) 
We then say that message ' ' m is equilibrium dominated for S in state t. Then a PBE does not meet the intuitive criterion if there exists a state ' t for which a message ' m is sent in E*, such that (4) and (5) apply to the pooling PBE where m 0 is always sent. █ We stress here that it is perfectly possible that a separating PBE meets the intuitive criterion, but not the pooling-based intuitive criterion. This occurs for separating PBE in which R employs strategies that differ fundamentally from those employed in the pooling PBE.
Following Van Rooij (2008) , the pooling-based intuitive criterion can be likened either to Grice's rather imprecise Maxim of Relevance, Be Relevant, or to his rather similar second Maxim of Quantity, Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. From these maxims it follows as a conversational implicature that if somebody says something, then it is going to be relevant.
We finally look at an equilibrium selection argument by means of which we attempt to take into account, in a basic way, literature that uses evolutionary game theory to select among the multiple PBE of signaling games (for an overview, see Huttegger & Zollman (2011) ). To catch the intuition that unsophisticated players may learn how to play a PBE of a signaling game, where players may come to behave as if they are sophisticated, this literature assumes that repeated random matching of pairs of players takes place in a population, where each player is equally likely to act as a sender or a receiver. Some form of evolutionary dynamics is added, such that strategies that were more successful in the past are more likely to be played in the future. A strategy profile is evolutionary stable if, after a small invasion of deviating players, the population is not lead away from this strategy profile. The literature deals with both cheap-talk signaling (Huttegger, 2007; Pawlowitsch, 2008) and with costly signaling (Blume et al. (1993 ), Jäger (2008 ), De Jaegher (2008a ). The main interest lies in whether or not players can get stuck at pooling PBE. The answer depends on whether or not one allows for evolutionary drift.
For cheap talk signaling, without evolutionary drift, as shown independently by Huttegger (2007) and by Pawlowitsch (2008) the population may get stuck at a pooling PBE where messages are sent in a way that is not sufficiently informative for R to let his actions depend on the messages received: such a PBE is stable both to small invasions of senders who are more informative, and to small invasions of receivers who differentiate their actions according to the messages received.
suffices for a separating PBE to evolve (where it should be noted that such an unstable pooling PBE can be attained through evolutionary drift from any other pooling PBE).
11
Moreover, as argued by De Jaegher (2008a), a population state where no messages are sent may be considered to be a natural starting point. For costly signaling, the pooling PBE where senders do not send any messages and receivers are unresponsive to messages is also evolutionary stable: since signals are costly, senders only become willing to send a costly message if a substantial part of the receiver population is responsive. Yet, exactly this can be achieved through evolutionary drift.
Our focus here is on, allowing for evolutionary drift when signals are costly, which separating PBE can evolve if players start at a population state where no messages are sent and where receivers are unresponsive to any signals (which we consider as a natural starting point, if we are interested in how players can learn to communicate).
12
A simple manner to answer this question is the criterion of attainability which we define below. We say of a separating PBE that it is attainable from a pooling PBE where S does not send messages and R is unresponsive to messages, if an alternative best response of R in the pooling PBE is to play the strategy corresponding to this separating PBE. 
Signaling games with a conflict of interest over the actions taken by the receiver
In all the models that we treat in this section, S has a bias towards actions with a lower label, and therefore, as long as R is gullible, will pretend that the state of the world has a lower label than it has in reality. How can S now still credibly signal that it is optimal for R to take a particular action? In all the models below, S who observes a state of the world with a low label makes her message credible by making the sending of this message prohibitively costly to a S observing any other state of the world. In the direct-signaling model (3.1), messages directly reveal information, and for a S who did not observe state t 1 it is impossible to reveal information that suggests that state t 1 occurs -whereas a sender who does observe state t 1 has no reason to hide information. In the costly-signaling model (3.2), the message literally takes the form of incurring a cost that S in other states would never want to incur. In the noisy-signaling model (3.3), sending messages as such may be costless, but S makes the message sent in state t 1 credible by making it noisy in such a way that it becomes unattractive to send in other states. In the imprecise-signaling model (3.3), again messages may be costless, but S makes the message sent in state t 1 less precise by sending this message both in states t 1 and t 2 . In this manner, it becomes too expensive for S who observed t 3 to cheat and send this message, as the induced action is then too remote from S's preferred action.
11 Hofbauer and Huttegger (2008) eliminate pooling PBE in this manner, by allowing for evolutionary drift. 12 The focus on which separating PBE evolves is also found in Benz et al. (2006) . Their approach, however, is to compare the size of the basins of attraction of separating PBE. 13 A related idea is Gilboa and Matsui's concept of accessibility. They say that a strategy profile is accessible from another strategy profile if there exists a dynamic path under best response dynamics from the latter to the former. A set of strategy profiles is cyclically stable if every strategy profile in the set is accessible from every other strategy profile, and no strategy profile outside the set is accessible from any strategy profile within the set. An application of cyclically stable sets to cheap talk games is found in Matsui (1991) .
Direct signaling
In a first type of signaling that we treat, the meaning of messages is not an issue, and their credibility is not an issue either. With direct signaling, sending a message means that information that unambiguously determines the state of the world can directly be revealed, or that a cue that makes it more likely that a certain state of the world occurs can be revealed. Such signaling games are also referred to as games of persuasion.
Consider a dictator who may or may not possess weapons of mass destruction. At no cost, let her be able to reveal evidence showing that she has such weapons, or reveal evidence that she has no such weapons. Alternatively, she can decide not to reveal any evidence at all. The dictator prefers that an inspector believes that she does not possess weapons, whether or not this is true. If the dictator always reveals any evidence that she has no weapons of mass destruction, the fact of not revealing evidence becomes a signal of having weapons, which in turn gives the dictator an incentive to reveal evidence whenever she does not possess weapons. A separating PBE therefore exists. If it is relatively likely that the dictator possesses weapons, or if it is relatively costly to the inspector to infer that the dictator does not have weapons when in fact she does, a pooling PBE exists where the inspector always infers that the dictator possesses weapons, and where the dictator never reveals any evidence. Such a PBE only exists if the inspector believes that any revealed evidence (which is currently not offered) that the dictator does not possess weapons is not credible. Yet, such beliefs are not rational, since revealed evidence is always credible by assumption. This pooling PBE is not a sequential equilibrium, and only the separating PBE survives. The inspector may be seen as pragmatically inferring that a dictator who does not reveal evidence must have something to hide. In economics, this is known as the "unraveling argument". It follows that focusing on sequential equilibria has the same effect here as Grice's first Maxim of Quantity, Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). The maxim in this context implies that if the dictator does not give additional information, then the inspector should conclude that this information (= the absence of weapons) simply does not exist. It should be noted that, although the effect is the same as what results from Grice's maxim, the way this effect is reached is different: the dictator did not necessarily want this effect to occur.
If it is relatively unlikely that the dictator has weapons or if it is relatively costly to the inspector to infer that the dictator has weapons when in fact she does not, however, a pooling PBE exists where the inspector always infers that the dictator does not possess weapons. Even if the inspector holds beliefs making her consider any revealed evidence as credible, the dictator who does not have weapons still weakly prefers not to reveal any evidence. R may threaten to consider any lack of evidence as a sign of possession of weapons, but such a threat is not credible. In terms of pragmatics, as in the absence of information the dictator is already getting her favorite response, the inspector should conclude from the absence of information that it is simply not in the dictator's interest to provide information.
Direct signaling conflict-of-interest model with two states of the world. In order to formalize this story, in a simplified version of a game introduced by Milgrom (1981) 
means that messages m 1 and m 2 effectively reveal which state of the world occurs, so that S's choice in each state is whether to reveal or not to reveal the state of the world. As shown in Proposition 1, in the pooling PBE where S always sends the empty message m 0 , R either always does a 1 (= interpret that she does not have weapons), or always does a 2 ( = interpret that she does). The former may occur if t 1 is more frequent or when doing a 2 in t 1 is relatively costly to R, the latter when t 2 is more frequent or when doing a 1 in t 2 is relatively costly to R. In separating PBE, state t 1 is always revealed, whereas state t 2 may or may not be revealed.
The pooling PBE where a 1 is always done is a sequential equilibrium. While R should always believe that message m 2 comes from t 2 , S does not have any reason to send m 2 . Intuitively, if in the absence of information R is biased towards the action most preferred by S (= interpret that the dictator does not have weapons), obfuscation takes place. The pooling PBE where a 2 is always done, on the contrary, is not a sequential equilibrium. As R should always believe that message m 1 comes from t 1 , S has an incentive to send m 1 in t 1 in this case.
14 Proposition 1. Consider the direct signaling game with two states of the world. In this game:
, a range of Pareto-efficient pooling PBE exists where R always does a 1 , S in state t 2 always sends m 0 , and S in state t 1 sends message m 0 with sufficiently high probability. These are also sequential equilibria.
(ii) if
, a range of Pareto-inefficient pooling PBE exists where R always does a 2 , S in state t 1 always sends m 0 , and S in state t 2 sends message m 0 with sufficiently high probability. However, these are not sequential equilibria.
(iii)in a range of Pareto-efficient separating PBE, S sends message m 1 when state t 1 occurs, and sends messages m 0 or m 2 when state t 2 occurs. The separating PBE are attainable from the pooling PBE under (ii), but not from those under (i).
. Whether or not the pooling PBE is a sequential equilibrium depends on whether t 1 or t 2 is more frequent. In the example in Table  2 , the states are equally likely but
, so that the cost of doing the wrong action is larger in state t 1 than in state t 2 (i.e., it is more costly to wrongly infer that the dictator does have weapons if she does not). In the pooling PBE, action a 1 (= infer that the dictator does not have weapons) is always done in this case, and this is a sequential PBE. In the example in Table 3 , the states are equally likely but
, meaning that the cost of doing the wrong action is larger in state t 2 than in state t 1 (i.e., it is more costly to wrongly infer that the dictator 14 It should be noted that in a model with a continuum of actions, obfuscation is never possible. In the pooling PBE, R will never take the action with the very lowest label then. All S in a state with a label lower than the one of the action taken in the PBE have an incentive to reveal their state. Once they have done so, R adopts an action with a higher label when not receiving any evidence. This again gives S an incentive to reveal evidence in additional states of the world. By the unraveling argument, this process continues until all evidence is revealed (Milgrom (1981) ). 15 In case (i), the pooling PBE is additionally attainable from the separating PBE where S sends m 1 (m 2 ) in state t 1 (t 2 ), and where R does a 2 with high probability when nothing is revealed. An alternative best response for R is to do a 1 when nothing is revealed, which is the equilibrium strategy in the pooling PBE. The separating PBE on the other hand is not attainable from the pooling PBE. Attainability thus predicts obfuscation in case (i).
does not have weapons if she does). In the pooling PBE, action a 2 (= infer that the dictator does have weapons) is always done, and this is not a sequential PBE. 
(1, 0) (0, 1) Table 3 .
Direct signaling conflict-of-interest model with two states of the world; equal probabilities, unequal cost of doing wrong action
We end our treatment of the two-state model by noting that analytically identical to this game is a cheap-talk signaling game where players share a common language, and where S is restricted to send messages in a truthful manner (i.e. such that the true state of the world needs to be a part of the event communicated by a message), with as the only alternative not to send a message. To make this concrete, suppose with Van Rooij (2008) that there are two states of the world: t 1 : John ate some but not all cookies, and t 2 : John ate all the cookies. Suppose that there are two messages: m 1 : "John ate some of the cookies", and m 2 : "John ate all the cookies". The semantic meaning of message m 1 is that John either ate some but not all of the cookies, or ate all of the cookies. Let S prefer that R guesses that John ate some but not all of the cookies. In the pooling PBE, S always sends m 1 . Suppose that in the pooling PBE R guesses that John ate some but not all of the cookies (which does not mean that R believes that this is always the case). Then this pooling PBE is neologism proof. No scalar implicature is drawn that "some" must mean "some but not all" (cf. Franke et al. (2012) ). R knows that it could be that John ate all the cookies; it is just that it is more likely that John did not eat all of the cookies. Consider instead that in the pooling PBE R guesses that John ate all cookies, and assume that S's choice is between message m 1 as defined above, and a message ' 1 m : "John ate some but not all of the cookies". Then the pooling PBE, where m 1 is still always sent, is not neologism proof, and the unraveling argument applies.
Consider now a variant of the dictator example where the dictator may possess both nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, but where she can present only evidence about whether or not she possesses a single type of weapons. Again, the dictator is better off if the inspector believes that she has no weapons. If the inspector is gullible and believes that evidence that one class of weapons is not possessed means that the other one is not possessed either, the dictator will present evidence on whatever class of weapons she happens not to possess. It thus seems that evidence that one type of weapons is not possessed, cannot be considered as credible by a non-gullible R. Indeed, a pooling PBE is a sequential equilibrium, since it is rational for R to believe that S reveals whatever evidence is to her advantage. However, the players may coordinate on R considering only evidence about one particular type of weapons as credible. This stops S from only revealing evidence that is to her advantage. Such PBE are attainable from the pooling PBE: allowing for evolutionary drift, R can plan to consider only evidence about a single type of weapons as convincing. This example illustrates the key point of pragmatics that more may be communicated than is literally said.
Direct signaling conflict-of-interest model with four states of the world and two events. Formally, two cues may take on a value of 1 (= no weapons) or 2 (= weapons), in any combination, leading to four states of the world. Each cue independently takes on a value of 1 with probability ) 1 ( x − , and a value of 2 with probability x. When state of the world (1, 1) (= no weapons at all) occurs, this is referred to as event t 1 (probability
). When either state of the world (1, 2), (2, 1) or (2, 2) (= at least one type of weapons) occurs, this is referred to as event t 2 (probability ]
(a 1 : interpret as not having weapons; a 2 : interpret as having weapons). Denoting by j i m , where the superscript j refers to the first or the second cue, and where subscript 1 = i ( = 2) means that the cue takes on a value of 1 (respectively 2), we have
We continue to assume that 0 )
. Further, it continues to be true that
We refer to this as the direct signaling conflict-of-interest game with four states of the world and two events.
In case the cost to R of wrongly concluding that event t 1 (= dictator has no weapons at all) occurs is relatively small, or if π 1 is relatively large, we simply obtain a variant of the model with two states of the world. In a partial separating PBE, S now reveals whatever information is to her advantage, by revealing a "1" as soon as at least one of the cues has a value of 1. While this means that R sometimes gets cheated, it is still a best response for him to do a 1 (= infer that the dictator has no weapons at all) whenever a 1 is revealed. Proposition 2 focuses on the case where it is not a best response for R to do a 1 as soon as a 1 is revealed. In this case, a partial separating PBE still exists where R only does a 1 when S reveals a specific cue to take on a value of 1, and where R ignores any information revealed on the other cue. While it may now still be the case that the other cue has a value of 2, in this PBE S cannot simply reveal whatever information is to her advantage. This case is only possible if the cost to R of wrongly concluding that event t 1 occurs is relatively large, or if not having weapons is relatively unlikely so that automatically in the pooling PBE a 2 is always done. This pooling PBE is now still a sequential equilibrium, however, because in the pooling PBE it is consistent for R to believe that whatever value of 1 S reveals, may be the value that happens to be to S's advantage. Still, partial separating PBE are attainable from the pooling PBE: evolutionary drift can cause R to only respond to a particular cue.
Proposition 2. In the direct-signaling model with four states of the world and two events, let A numerical example of Proposition 2 is given in Table 4 . R's payoffs have been chosen such that doing the wrong action is equally costly in both events t 1 and t 2 . The probability x of any individual cue taking on a value of 2 is assumed to be 2/5. The updated probability of both cues having value 1 (i.e. of event t 1 occurring, i.e. "the dictator has no weapons at all") when S reveals a "1" as soon as at least one cue has a value of 1, equals
, so that R prefers to do a 2 (i.e., infer that the dictator has weapons) when seeing a "1" revealed, meaning that a partial separating PBE where S reveals whatever information is to her advantage does not exist. Yet, the updated probability of both cues having a value of 1 when S only reveals when a specific cue has a value of 1 equals
, so that R does do a 1 (i.e., infer that the dictator does not have weapons) when seeing a specific "1" revealed.
States of the world t 1 (π 1 = 9/25) 1, 1 (Prob.: Table 4 
. Direct signaling conflict-of-interest model with four states of the world and two events
As Proposition 2 shows, the principle of considering only one piece of evidence relevant cannot be explained by means of the equilibrium selection arguments introduced in Section 2 which are based on rationality (specifically, the concept of a sequential equilibrium). As suggested by the following motivating example by Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, p.160) , instead using a particular piece of evidence only may be focal: "You are participating in a public debate about the level of education in the world's capitals. You are trying to convince the audience that in most capital cities, the level of education has risen recently. Someone is challenging you, bringing up indisputable evidence showing that the level of education in Bangkok has deteriorated. Now it is your turn to respond. You have similar, indisputable evidence to show that the level of education in Mexico City, Manila, Cairo and Brussels has gone up. However, because of time constraints, you can argue and present evidence only about one of the four cities mentioned above. Which city would you choose for making the strongest counterargument against Bangkok?"
The authors conducted an experiment on this question, showing that most of the time the counterargument is Manila. The point here is that by the fact that Manila is closest to Bangkok, S signals that she is choosing a particular cue, and not necessarily the cue that is most to her advantage. Thus, there is some focal feature of one of the cues that makes it seem that a particular cue was chosen, and not one necessarily to the advantage of S. 16 Such an argument cannot be caught in an analytical model, where focality is undefined.
Costly signaling
In the next model, signals do not directly reveal S's information, so that credibility is an issue. Meaning may or may not be an issue, in that signals may or may not be grounded in a common language. S always would like to get the same response. The manner in which messages are still made credible is that they are costly, and that S's cost incurred from sending a message differs according to the state of the world. The principle of pragmatic inference applied here is that a particular message could never have been sent by senders in certain states of the world, as sending such a message is too costly to them. For instance, suppose that a sender always wants to be considered as being rich. Then a separating PBE exists where lighting a cigar with a $100 bill may be considered a credible signal that one is rich, as a poor person finds it too costly to do this. Burning a $100 bill may or may not already have a commonly known meaning of signaling richness. The point here is that this message is credible. This model has independently been developed in economics (educational signaling on the labor market, Spence, 1973) and in biology (handicap signaling, Zahavi, 1974) .
On top of the separating PBE, a pooling PBE exists where R ignores any message sent by S. Yet, one may argue that burning $100 is dominated by not burning $100 for the poor person, as the worst that the poor person can get from not burning $100, namely to be considered as poor, is better than the best that the poor person can get from burning $100, namely be considered as rich. R will therefore always interpret the burning of $100 as being done by a rich person. Still, only if in the pooling PBE R expects S to be poor, will this interpretation by R destroy the pooling PBE. If in the pooling PBE, R expects S to be rich, S does not have any incentive to burn $100, even if this message is never misunderstood. Alternatively, one may argue that by the intuitive criterion, if in the pooling PBE S is considered to be poor, and R sees S unexpectedly burn a $100 bill, R should reason that only a rich person has an incentive to deviate from the pooling PBE. Therefore, the pooling PBE, which then is also Pareto inefficient, does not meet the intuitive criterion. If in the pooling PBE, S is already considered to be rich, the pooling PBE is also Pareto efficient as it is preferred by S, and does meet the intuitive criterion, as it is not the case that only a rich person has an incentive to burn a $100 bill. These facts are only reinforced if burning $100 already has a common meaning referring to richness. Also, dominance and the intuitive criterion eliminate PBE where S who is rich burns more money than is necessary to distinguish herself form the poor consumer. Finally, in the pooling PBE where all senders are considered poor, through evolutionary drift R can come to play the strategy which is a best response in the separating PBE, while in the pooling PBE where all senders are considers as rich, he cannot. Thus, allowing for evolutionary drift, unsophisticated receivers may replicate the intuitive criterion.
As pointed out in Section 2, the application of the (pooling-based) intuitive criterion here resembles both the Maxim of Relevance, and the second Maxim of Quantity: the receiver should consider the burning of $100 as relevant. At the same time, if the distribution of states of the world is such that S is considered rich even when not burning any money, R should infer from the fact that no money is burned that S simply does not have any incentive to incur costs to give information, as it is not in the interests of S to give information.
Costly signaling conflict-of-interest model. Formally Proposition 3. Consider the conflict-of-interest costly signaling game. Let
, a Pareto-efficient pooling PBE exists where R does a 1 in any event and S always sends m 0 . This PBE is neologism proof, is not eliminated by dominance, and meets the intuitive criterion.
(ii) If
, a Pareto-inefficient pooling PBE exists where R does a 2 in any event and S always sends m 0 . This PBE is not neologism proof, is eliminated by dominance, and does not meet the intuitive criterion. (iii) Separating PBE exist where S sends m in t 1 and m 0 in t 2 . The only separating equilibrium that is Pareto-efficient uses an m that has the lowest ( )
for which the given conditions are valid; this is also the only separating PBE that is not eliminated by dominance and meets the intuitive criterion. If
), the separating PBE are attainable (resp. not attainable) from the pooling PBE, meet (resp. do not meet) the pooling-based intuitive criterion and are (resp. are not) pooling-based neologism proof.
means that it must be costly for S in state t 2 (= poor) to send message m, meaning that costly messages is a necessary condition for a separating PBE in the specified game. Yet, it should be noted that m need not be costly in state t 1 (= rich), meaning that in equilibrium a cost of signaling need not ever be incurred (Hurd, 1995) . In the most well-known version of the second condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium,
, it is more costly for poor S than for rich S to send a message). This means that the message must be differentially costly; put otherwise, it must be more costly to send message m in state t 2 than in state t 1 (Grafen, 1990 ). Yet, less well-known is that signals need not be differentially costly. If ( ) ( )
, so that message m is equally costly in all states, then a separating PBE can still exist
, it is more important for rich S than for poor S to be perceived as rich). This is the differential benefits version of Spence-Zahavi model (Johnstone, 1997) . Intuitively, either there is a message that is too costly to send in state t 2 ; or the cost of sending a message is the same in all states, but S in state t 1 is more motivated to send a costly message.
A numerical example of case (i) in Proposition 3 is given in Table 5 . In this case,
, S is twice as likely to be poor than rich, and the cost of misinterpreting rich as poor is four times larger than the cost of misinterpreting poor as rich). While state t 2 is twice as likely to occur than state t 1 , the cost to R of doing the wrong action in state t 2 is so small that R still prefers to do a 1 (= interpret rich) when not having any information. As ( )
, separating PBE exist (as the cost of sending a message is the same to S in both states, this illustrates the differential benefits model). Assuming that these are the lowest costs at which separating is obtained, both the pooling PBE and the separating PBE described are Pareto efficient, where the former are preferred by R and the latter by S. A numerical example of case (ii) in Proposition 3 is given in Table 6 . In this case,
, S is twice as likely to be poor than rich, and the cost of misinterpreting rich as poor and poor as rich is the same). State t 2 is twice more likely to occur than state t 1 , and the cost of doing the wrong action is the same in the two states of the world, so that in pooling PBE, R always does a 2 (i.e. interpret poor). Separating PBE are therefore preferred by both R and S. These continue to exist, as ( )
(this illustrates the differential costs model, as benefits are the same to S in each state, but costs of sending messages differ).
(1, 0.75) (0.75, 1) 0.3 Table 5 . Costly signaling conflict-of-interest model: differential benefits (2011)), Romeo wants to know from Juliet whether or not she loves him (two states of the world). Romeo can take three actions: he can either conclude that Juliet loves him, conclude that she does not love him, or make no conclusion. Whether or not she loves Romeo, Juliet most prefers that Romeo concludes that she loves him, and least prefers that he does not make any conclusion, with Romeo's conclusion that he does not love her in between. Because of Juliet's preferences, her message "I love you", expressed in a common language, is not credible to Romeo. Still, Juliet's message "I love you" can be made credible if it is noisy. In particular, if her message "I love you" is sometimes misinterpreted by Romeo to be inconclusive (the worst possible outcome to Juliet), and is misinterpreted in this manner more often than her "I don't love you" message, then a separating PBE may exist where Juliet prefers to be honest.
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The model both has similarities to and differences with the costly signaling model of Section 3.2. Just as in the costly signaling model, Juliet makes her "I love you" message credible by making it costly, and more costly than the "I don't love you" message (i.e. costs are differential), where the cost is incurred because of the probability of misinterpretations. Moreover, just as is the costly signaling model, Romeo needs to observe that Juliet's messages are costly (in being subject to misinterpretations); otherwise, Juliet could pretend that her messages are subject to misinterpretations, but always send an unambiguous "I love you" message. A difference with the costly signaling model is that both the "I love you" and the "I don't love you" message need to be subject to misinterpretations and therefore costly, in being sometimes inconclusive. If only the "I love you" message is sometimes inconclusive, then inconclusiveness becomes a signal that Juliet loves Romeo, and Juliet no longer prefers to be honest. Because of this fact, the pooling PBE is neologism proof. A single noisy neologism cannot convince Romeo that Juliet is honest. Instead, Romeo needs to believe that Juliet uses a system of two noisy messages.
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Yet, any separating PBE is attainable from the pooling PBE, allowing for evolutionary drift: if Romeo becomes predisposed to being responsive to two noisy messages, Juliet can next honestly send the two noisy messages. Also, Pareto inefficient separating PBE exist where Juliet makes her messages more noisy than is necessary to make her messages credible. Such separating PBE are again not neologism proof, and the efficient separating PBE is attainable from any inefficient separating PBE.
From a pragmatic point of view, even the efficient separating PBE would seem to violate the maxims of the Maxim of Manner, Be perspicuous. Yet, Romeo should understand that given the conflict of interest with Juliet, combined with the common interest to still achieve some degree of communication, Juliet's failure to be perspicuous is the only manner to achieve this.
Analytically, noisy messages are obtained by putting a move by Nature between the stage where Juliet sends a message, and Romeo receives a message, where Nature with a certain probability lets Romeo perceive a different message than was sent by Juliet. Several intuitions have been offered to justify such a mechanism (see De Jaegher and Van Rooij (2011) ). First, messages may literally be noisy. Myerson (1991, pp. 285-288) gives the example of a sender letting a carrier pigeon carry a message to a receiver, where the pigeon sometimes gets lost. Blume et al. (2007b) extend Crawford and Sobel's (1981) model (for a simplified version, see Section 3.4) and assume that each message is subject to error with the same probability. An error generates the same distribution over received messages for each message. The authors' main result is that for low levels of such noise, players do better than in the most informative equilibrium of the standard Crawford and Sobel model. In Blume and Board (2012) , S can 17 To construct such a model, it does not suffice that Romeo can only take two actions, namely an interpretation that Juliet loves Romeo, and an interpretations that she does not. In order to make the "I love you" message less attractive, one could let it be confounded more often for "I don't love you". In order for the "I love you" message to contain information, it must be more often interpreted as "I love you" than as "I don't love you". But then, the "I love you" message is always more attractive to Juliet. 18 A similar problem, where only a signaling system is credible, is described by Matthews et al. (1991, p.256) . Consider a simple common interest cheap-talk signaling game with two states of the world and three actions. Let R take an action in the pooling PBE which is never taken in the separating PBE, and which in both states of the world leaves S worse off than in the separating PBE. Then the pooling PBE is neologism proof, because S in both states of the world has an incentive to pretend to be any type. Yet, it still seems intuitive that a separating PBE would be played. For this reason, the authors develop the equilibrium selection criterion of announcement proofness, which refers to the credibility of the whole signaling system. herself choose the level of noise in her messages, and does so in equilibrium as this mitigates conflict.
Second, messages may not themselves be noisy, but S may let the message she sends depend on payoff-irrelevant events, which are not perfectly observed by R (De Jaegher (2003a); De Jaegher and Van Rooij (2011) ). In general, the equilibria described then belong to the class of correlated equilibria, where players use imperfectly correlated events to determine which strategy they play (if these events are fully uncorrelated, we get a mixed equilibrium). While it would seem that we need a different model then, where Nature first decides on which events are observed by the players, and then lets them choose their strategies, a model with noisy messages is in fact equivalent. Concretely, Juliet may send the "I love you" message in several contexts, where Romeo imperfectly observes these contexts. She may e.g., send this message both in the context where she loves Romeo, and in the context where she does not love him, but just had an excellent time on a date. Romeo gets an imperfect cue of whether Juliet had an excellent time, and makes no conclusion about her feelings if she says "I love you" and he gets a cue that she had an excellent time. In this way, Juliet's message "I love you" sometimes leads to Juliet's least preferred response. Forges (1988) shows, for discrete signaling games, the equivalence between equilibria where players communicate through a noisy communication channel, as in the first interpretation above, and correlated equilibria.
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Third, as argued by Blume and Board (2012) , noise could be created by the fact that the players only share a partially common language. Romeo then faces in fact a population of Juliet's, who interpret the same message in a different way, centred around a certain average interpretation (cf. Rohit Parikh (1994) ). Yet, it is not clear in this case why the asymmetry in the meaning the players attach to messages would take exactly such a form that solves the conflict of interest.
Noisy signaling conflict-of-interest model (De Jaegher, 2003a Jaegher, , 2003b (in terms of the story, a 1 : interpret that Juliet loves; a 2 : interpret that Juliet does not love; a 3 : draw no conclusion). M contains m 0 as well as messages m which may or may not have a common meaning, and which vary according to the probability with which they are confounded with m 0 , i.e. which vary according to the level of )
e., Juliet prefers that Romeo interprets that she loves him, rather than that he interprets that she does not love him, rather than that he does now draw any conclusion), and that
, where 3 , i j ≠ (i.e., Romeo considers not drawing any conclusion as better than drawing a wrong conclusion, and worse than drawing a right conclusion 
. Among these PBE, the unique Pareto-efficient PBE, where noise is at the minimal level which still allows for a separating equilibrium, is attainable from the pooling PBE in (i), and from the Pareto-inefficient separating PBE. The Paretoinefficient separating PBE are attainable from the pooling PBE, but are not neologism proof. Table 7 . Clearly, in every pooling PBE, R does a 3 (= draw no conclusion) in this case. In the separating PBE, S in t 1 (Juliet loves Romeo) prefers to send message m 1 ("I love you") rather than message m 2 ("I don't love you") given that ) 
, so that the updated probability that t 2 occurs equals 0.375. It follows that R, when not receiving a message, prefers to do a 3 (= draw no conclusion) to either a 1 or a 2 , as 0.75 > 0.625*1, and 0.75 > 0.375*1.
Imprecise signaling
Under the pressure of the local tourist industry, a weather forecaster would like to systematically predict higher temperatures than will truly occur at the seaside -unless it is perfect beach weather anyway. When the temperature will be 20 o C, the weather forecaster would like the public to believe the temperature is 22 o C, when it will be 22 o C she would like them to believe it will be 24 o C, and when it will be 24 o C she would like them to believe it is indeed 24 o C. How can the forecaster's prediction still be credible? The forecaster can achieve credibility by being imprecise. Given that she does not want the public's expectations to deviate too widely from the truth, if she makes her messages imprecise, she gives herself an incentive to send these messages in a truthful way. In this case, in a partial separating PBE, she could predict that it will be 20 o C if this is indeed true, and predict that it will be 22 o C or more in all other cases, where the latter leads to an expectation by the public that it will be 24 o C. Given this response by the public to her imprecise message, the forecaster does not want to predict that it will be at least 22 o C when it will be only 20 o C. Along with the partial separating PBE, a pooling PBE exists where the public always forms the same expectations, whatever the forecast, and where the forecaster does not make any forecast. The partial separating PBE is attainable from this pooling PBE, and the pooling PBE is also not neologism proof, whatever the form it takes. If in the pooling PBE the public expects 20 . In every state, R prefers to take the action with the same label. S can choose from a set of noiseless, costless messages. Contrary to Crawford and Sobel, we also consider the case where these messages have meaning in a common language. Following Crawford and Sobel, S in each state prefers an action with a (weakly) lower label than the action preferred by R (i.e., prefers an interpretation of 2 o C higher, if available), and therefore contrary to the models in Sections 3.1 to 3.3, S does not systematically prefer action a 1 . In state t 3 , S's most preferred response is a 2 , but she still prefers that R adopts response a 3 rather than a 1 (i.e. when the temperature is 20 o C, S prefers interpretation 20 o C to 24 o C). In both states t 2 and t 1 , she prefers him to take action a 1 (i.e., interpret 24 o C). When only knowing that state t 3 does not occur, R prefers response a 1 (i.e. when R knows that it is 22 o C or 24 o C, he prefers interpretation 24 o C). As shown in Proposition 5, the conflict of interest is resolved if S sends the same message in states t 2 and t 1 . This is the only type of partial separating PBE, and illustrates Crawford and Sobel's result that the amount of information that can be communicated is inversely related with the degree of conflict (where it should be noted that Crawford and Sobel's purpose is not to explain any natural language phenomena). We obtain that pooling PBE are not neologism proof, and a partial separating PBE is always attainable from a pooling PBE. 21 21 The partial separating PBE is neologism proof here, as is the case for all separating PBE that we describe in this paper. For Crawford and Sobel's (1981) original model with a continuum of states of the world and a continuum of actions, this result is not general. In fact, none of their partial separating PBE are neologism proof. This is because, in terms of our model, if there is a continuum of actions, S in the states of the world with the lowest labels has an incentive to send a neologism, whereas S in other states of the world does not have any such incentive. The neologism would seem to lead to more precision, yet no partial separating PBE may exist allowing for such precision, as is illustrated by the fact that the most informative partial separating PBE is not neologism proof. Because of this result, a set of alternative equilibrium selection arguments have been developed in the literature, which still select the most informative partial separating PBE in Crawford and Sobel's model. E.g. Chen et al. (2008) construct an equilibrium selection argument based on the observation that in all inefficient partial separating PBE in Crawford and Sobel, S in the state with the highest label prefers revealing her type (if somehow she could) to the equilibrium outcome. For a further recent example, see De Groot Ruiz et al. (2011) , which also contains a literature overview of further equilibrium selection arguments for cheap-talk signaling games dealing with this issue.
The reason that this issue does not arise in our model, is that we have discrete actions. In our neologism-proof partial separating PBE, R takes the action with the lowest possible label, so that there is no incentive for S in the state of the world with the lowest label to send a neologism. C) when receiving message 1. But then, given that S prefers that a 1 is done in state t 2 , she will send the message 1 in state t 2 as well, so that such a partial separating PBE does not exist. Consider next a candidate partial separating PBE where message 1 is sent in states t 1 and t 2 , and message 2 in state t 3 . Then, when receiving message 1, given that t 1 is more likely, R does a 1 ; when receiving message 2, R does a 3 (= interpret 20 o C). The payoffs for S have been chosen in such a manner that it is now a best response for S to follow the strategy prescribed by this partial separating PBE.
From a pragmatic point of view, the partial separating PBE described in Proposition 5 may be said to violate the Maxim of Manner, Be perspicuous. Yet, it is the fact that S is not perspicuous that solves the conflict of interest. For an example where this seems to be the case, consider the following (Grice (1989) This example is somewhat misleading, as it suggests that in the model, S needs to be visibly imprecise in order to make her messages credible. This is not the case. Going back to the weather forecaster example at the start of this section, it does not matter for the existence of a partial separating PBE whether the forecaster uses the imprecise message "It is 22 o C or more" 22 It should be noted that Grice (1989) himself argues that in this example, the person asking the question should conclude that the person giving the answer simply does not know where exactly in the South of France C lives. This is because Grice assumes a context with common interests between S and R. both when it is 22 o C and 24 o C (where this message is used is a truthful way) 23 , or uses the precise message "It is 24 o C" in both these states (where this message is not always used in a truthful way). What matters is that S sends messages that lead to actions that are sufficiently distant from one another, in order to align the interests of S and R. This is in contrast with the model of noisy signaling in Section 3.3, where it is essential that R can observe the level of noise of the messages sent; if not, S would pretend to be noisy but let the message that is most in her interest arrive as often as possible. This is because the conflict of interest in Section 3.3 is more radical, in that S always prefers the action with the lowest label, whereas in the current section, S merely prefers an action with a lower label.
In this respect, it should be noted that in the models of noisy signaling of Blume et al. (2007b) and Blume and Board (2012) , it is also the case that S prefers an action that has a lower label, and does not always prefer the action with the lowest label. Yet, in Blume and Board (2012) , it is S in the state with a higher label who sends a noisy message (contrary to Section 3.3, where it is S in the state with a lower label who sends a more noisy message); interests are then still aligned, because the message is then more often misunderstood to refer to a state that has a lower label. Thus, in terms of the Romeo and Juliet example in Section 3.3., in Blume and Board, Juliet does not send a noisy "I love you" message, but a noisy "I don't love you" message, which by the fact that it is sometimes misinterpreted as "I love you" leads Juliet to still be honest. It need not be the case then that R observes how noisy messages are. Simply, by sending a message that is "closer" to the message sent by a Juliet who loves Romeo, S aligns the preferences.
Games with common interests over the actions taken by the receiver
In the conflict-of interest signaling models of Section 3, the driving principle is that S is biased towards always reporting the same state of the world. If this state of the world actually occurs, the only manner in which S in a particular state of the world can still convince R of this is by making his message costly in such a manner that S in another state of the world would never want to put up with. S could have sent a costless or at least a cheaper message, but R infers from the fact that a costly message was sent that he must be facing a S in a particular state of the world. This can happen by revealing information that only a S in this state could reveal, and by making one's message costly to send in terms of the direct cost of sending it, or indirectly in terms of its noisiness or imprecision (where it should be noted that in the case of imprecision, visibility of the cost incurred by being imprecise is not in fact needed).
In the current section, we treat common-interest signaling models, where S and R agree over what is R's best action in each state of the world. This time (where relevant), messages are assumed to be inherently costly, noisy or imprecise, but differentially so. For costly signaling, noisy signaling and imprecise signals, the intuition is each time that it is efficient for S and R to incur any unavoidable costs of signaling only in states where this cost has the least impact. 24 Thus, in Pareto-efficient PBE, a costly message should only be sent in infrequent states, so that the costs of sending messages are as low as possible. 25 Similarly, the cost of 23 It is tempting to conclude that the receiver of the weather forecast would conclude from a message "It is 22 o C or more" that it is 22 o C, reasoning that if it is 24 o C, the forecaster would simply report this. But this problem with this argument is that the forecaster also has an incentive to tell that it is 24 o C when in fact it is 22 o C. 24 In the case of costly signaling, R is indifferent about whether the cheapest messages are used, and whether more expensive messages are used in infrequent states. Yet, as S is not indifferent, separating PBE where messages are not used in an inefficient way from S's point of view, are also Pareto inefficient. 25 Recall that an outcome is Pareto-efficient if there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well off and at least one player strictly better off. A PBE need not be Pareto-efficient. noisiness or imprecision should be incurred in states where this has less impact, again because these states are infrequent or because mistakes are less costly in these states. Yet, Paretoinefficient separating PBE also exist where players coordinate on using messages in a costinefficient manner; the reason is not, as in Section 3, because messages are used that are too costly, but because the costly messages are sent in the wrong states of the world. Standard equilibrium selection arguments cannot eliminate such Pareto-inefficient separating PBE; here, we will make use of our argument that the pooling PBE where R takes the same action in all events is a natural starting point, and we will apply pooling-based neologism proofness, and the pooling-based intuitive criterion, as introduced in Section 2. In our common-interest direct signaling model, the intuition is different. There, it is efficient to trust that revelations by the sender that are as such inconclusive (e.g., a single piece of good news) still tell something about the overall state of the world (e.g., overall good news).
Direct signaling
Direct signaling common-interest model with two states of the world. We start this section by noting that, while we have treated direct signaling as a quite separate category of signaling, where S is able to directly reveal information to R, in game-theoretic pragmatics (see Van Rooij (2008) ), direct signaling models have been applied to treat the case where S and R share a common language, and where S can only choose between sending a message in a truthful manner (i.e. such that the true state of the world should be a part of the event that is communicated), or not to send any message at all. This assumption can be seen as being based on Grice's Maxim of Quality. Analytically, there is no difference then with a direct signaling model. To make this concrete, suppose with Van Rooij (2008) that there are two states of the world: t 1 : John ate some but not all cookies, and t 2 : John ate all the cookies. Suppose there are two messages: m 1 : "John ate some of the cookies", and m 2 : "John ate all the cookies". The semantic meaning of message m 1 is that John either ate some but not all of the cookies, or ate all of the cookies. In the pooling PBE, given the restriction that messages can only be sent truthfully, m 1 is always sent. Van Rooij assumes that 2 1 π π > , such that given the payoffs he assumes, R in the pooling PBE guesses that John ate some but not all of the cookies. Van Rooij shows that in this case, the pooling PBE is not neologism proof. The only neologism proof PBE is the separating PBE where message m 1 (m 2 ) is used to refer to state t 1 (t 2 ) (one can use a similar argument to show that the separating PBE is the only sequential equilibrium). This explains scalar implicatures, in which "some" is interpreted as "some but not all".
In the spirit of the current paper, we can additionally consider the case 2 1 π π < , which given Van Rooij's payoffs means that in the pooling PBE, where message m 1 is always sent, R interprets that John ate all the cookies. Consider now that on top of m 1 , a message ' 1 m rather than a message m 2 is available, which has semantic meaning "John ate some but not all the cookies". By the same argument as used by Van Rooij, the only neologism proof PBE is the separating PBE where message ' 1 m (m 1 ) is used to refer to state t 1 (t 2 ). Thus, a message "some" would now refer to "all", and an explicit message "some but not all" would refer to "some but not all".
We now return to the second dictator example of Section 3.1, where the dictator is only able to reveal evidence on a single cue. We now assume instead that dictator and inspector have common interests. Thus, if she were able to do so, the dictator would reveal to the inspector her status with respect to both chemical and nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, due to costs she is only able to reveal either evidence on whether or not she has nuclear weapons, or evidence on whether or not she has chemical weapons, but not both types of evidence. The problem now is that if she reveals that she does not have nuclear weapons, this is unconvincing to the inspector, if he does not make any conclusions about the presence of chemical weapons, from the dictator's revelation that she does not have nuclear weapons. Yet, dictator and inspector can still coordinate on one of the following separating PBE. When not having weapons of mass destruction, the dictator may reveal for one of the types of weapons that she does not have them; she may combine this with not revealing anything as soon as she does have at least one of the weapon types, or with revealing evidence on whatever type of weapons she has. Alternatively, as soon as the dictator has at least one type of weapons, she reveals evidence about one of the weapon types; if she does not have any weapons, either she does not reveal anything, or reveals evidence that she does not have one of the weapon types. Of particular interest to us here is the separating PBE where the dictator reveals that she does not have one or other type of weapons, only if she does not have any weapons at all. While the partial information revealed is as such not sufficient for the inspector to conclude that the dictator does not have weapons, by the circumstances in which the dictator reveals this information, it becomes credible. Disclosure messages can thus have uses that transcend the material disclosure itself.
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From the perspective of pragmatics, the example again illustrates that messages may communicate a lot more than the information which they literally contain.
As shown in Proposition 6, whether or not the concept of a sequential equilibrium predicts this principle to apply depends on the form of the pooling PBE. If in the pooling PBE the inspector in any event acts as if there are no weapons of mass destruction, then out-ofequilibrium evidence that the dictator does have one type of weapon can only have been sent by a dictator who does have weapons. The pooling PBE is thus not a sequential equilibrium. There is nothing special about the mechanism that makes players escape the pooling PBE, as revelation by the dictator that she has one particular type of weapons of course reveals that she has at least one type of weapons. Yet, if in the pooling PBE the inspector acts in any event as if there are weapons of mass destruction, then out-of-equilibrium evidence that the dictator does not have a particular type of weapons can also have been sent by a dictator who does have the other type of weapons; for this reason, the pooling PBE is a sequential equilibrium in this case. While a separating PBE exists where the inspector concludes from revelation that the dictator does not have one type of weapons, that she does not have any weapons, the concept of the sequential equilibrium does not predict that players will escape the pooling PBE. Yet, the specified separating PBE is still attainable from the pooling PBE: if evolutionary drift causes R to consider evidence that one type of weapons is not possessed as credible, the specified separating PBE can evolve.
Direct signaling common-interest model with four states of the world and two events. The model is identical to the two-cue model in Section 3.1, except that S and R have common interests, in that both prefer that R guesses the correct state of the world. S still is only able to reveal a single cue. A separating PBE now exists where S only reveals one of the cues to be "1" (i.e. evidence of not having a particular type of weapons) if in fact both cues are "1", and does not reveal anything otherwise (separating PBE 1). This is in spite of the fact that literally speaking, a single "1" revealed does not give R sufficient direct information that event t 1 occurs ("the dictator does not have weapons of mass destruction"). Further, a separating PBE exists where S reveals a "2" (i.e. evidence of having a particular type of weapons) if at least one of the cues is "2", and nothing otherwise (separating PBE 2). Finally, a separating PBE exists where S reveals a "1" if both cues have a value of 1, and a "2" if at least one of the cues is "2" (separating PBE 3). Depending on the parameters, in the pooling PBE, either a 1 is always done (= interpret that the dictator does not have weapons, pooling PBE 1), or a 2 (= interpret that the dictator has weapons, pooling PBE 2). Proposition 6 shows that pooling PBE 1 is not a sequential equilibrium but pooling PBE 2 is. From pooling PBE 1, only separating PBE 2 and 3 are attainable, from pooling PBE 2, only separating PBE 1 and 3 are attainable.
Proposition 6. Consider the direct signaling common-interest model with four states of the world and two events. 
, this separating PBE is attainable from the pooling PBE under (ii). Finally, a separating PBE exists where S reveals a "1" only if both cues have value of 1, and reveals a "2" if at least one of two values is 2; this separating PBE is attainable both from the pooling PBE under (i), and from the one under (ii).
The results in Proposition 6 show a fundamental difference with the conflict-of-interest variant of this model in Section 3.1. With a conflict of interest, in a separating PBE, S reports only the value of a specific cue and never the information on the other cue in order to avoid giving the impression that she only reports information that is to her advantage. With common interests, S may report the value of any cue that happens to be representative for the overall state of the world.
For a numerical example, consider Table 9 , where the probability x of one cue taking on a value of 2 (= does not have a particular type of weapons) equals 2/5. As the odds in favor of event 1 (= does not have weapons at all) occurring are 9 to 16, and as the costs of doing the wrong action are the same in each state, in the pooling PBE R does a 2 (= interpret that the dictator has weapons). This is a sequential equilibrium, as a single revealed "1" could also have been sent in event t 2 (= has at least one type of weapons). Still, a separating PBE exists where S reveals a "1" only if the two cues have a value of 1, and this separating PBE is attainable from the pooling PBE. In the example in Table 10 , the probability x of one cue taking on a value of 2 equals 1/5. The odds in favor of event 1 occurring are 16 to 9, so that in the pooling PBE R does a 1 (= interpret that the dictator does not have weapons). This is not a sequential equilibrium, as R should realize that a single revealed "2" can only have been sent in state t 2 .
States of the world t 1 (π 1 = 9/25) 1, 1 (Prob.: (1 -x) 2 = 9/25) (1, 1) (0, 0) t 2 (π 2 = 16/25) 1, 2 (Prob.: x(1 -x) = 6/25) (0, 0) (1, 1) 2, 1 (Prob.: (1 -x) x = 6/25) 2, 2 (Prob.: x 2 = 4/25) 
Costly signaling
Consider two drivers driving in opposite directions on the same road, and assume that they have common interests. Driver 1 can see whether or not there is a speed control ahead for driver 2. Most of the time, there is no speed control ahead. The only message available for driver 1 to send to driver 2 is to flash her headlights. But how should driver 2 interpret driver 1 flashing her headlights? As flashing one's headlights requires some effort, the most efficient outcome is that flashing one's headlights means that there is a speed camera ahead. In this way, the effort of sending the message is incurred as infrequently as possible. If in the pooling PBE, it is optimal to act as if there is no speed camera ahead, then the pooling-based intuitive criterion indeed predicts that the efficient separating PBE will be played. From the perspective of pragmatics, again the Maxim of Relevance, and the second Maxim of Quantity can be invoked. Yet, so can the Maxim of Manner, calling upon the sender to Be perspicuous. This principle is also reflected in Horn's (1984) division of pragmatic labor, saying that (un)marked states receive an (un)marked expression. 28 Yet, if in the pooling PBE it is optimal to act as if there is a speed camera ahead, simply because of the consequences of being caught speeding are severe, then the Maxim of Relevance and the Maxim of Quantity predict play of the inefficient separating PBE, where the driver 1 flashes her headlights when there is no speed camera ahead. As it is these maxims that have a link to the pooling-based intuitive criterion, a conflict therefore arises here between the predictions of game theory and the Maxims of Relevance and of Quantity on the one hand, and the Maxim of Manner on the other hand. Prashant Parikh (1991 Parikh ( , 2000 Parikh ( , 2001 , while not considering the pooling PBE where the infrequent state is always guessed, still gives prominence to the Maxim of Manner by arguing that the fact that one separating PBE is Pareto superior, will serve as a focal point.
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Costly signaling common-interest model. T = {t 1 , t 2 } (t 1 : speed camera ahead; t 2 : no speed camera ahead), and A = {a 1 , a 2 } (respectively drive slow and drive fast). In an essential feature of this game, we assume that state t 1 is less frequent than state t 2 , i.e.
2 1 π π < (speed cameras occur infrequently). S can choose to send any message from a set M with messages with the same nonzero cost C(m, t) and with µ(m 0 |m) = 0, where these messages may or may not have a meaning in a common language. The cost of sending a message is assumed to be nominal (cf. Blume et al. (1993) ), in that it is smaller than any marginal benefit of taking one action rather than the other. As shown in Proposition 7, in terms of the driver example, there exists an efficient separating PBE where driver 1 flashes her headlights only if there is a speed control ahead, as well as an inefficient separating PBE where the first driver flashes her headlights only if there is no speed control ahead. Further, depending on the parameters, in pooling PBE, driver 2 either drives slow or fast. The efficient separating PBE is only predicted to be played by pooling-based neologism proofness, the pooling-based intuitive criterion, and by attainability if in the pooling PBE, R does a 2 (driver 2 drives fast). If R does a 1 (= drive slow) in the pooling PBE, then the inefficient separating PBE is systematically predicted.
Proposition 7.
Consider the costly signaling common-interest model. Then efficient separating PBE exists where S sends a costly message only in state t 1 , along with inefficient separating PBE where S sends a costly message only in state t 2 .
, an inefficient pooling PBE exists where R does a 2 in any event. This pooling PBE is not neologism proof and does not meet the intuitive criterion. Efficient separating PBE are pooling-based neologism proof, meet the poolingbased intuitive criterion and can be attained from the pooling PBE, whereas none of this is the case for the inefficient separating PBE.
, an inefficient pooling PBE exists where R does a 1 in any event. This pooling PBE is not neologism proof and does not meet the intuitive criterion. Inefficient separating PBE are pooling-based neologism proof, meet the pooling-based intuitive criterion and can be attained from the pooling PBE, whereas none of this is the case for the efficient separating PBE.
Numerical examples illustrating Proposition 7 can be found in Tables 11 and 12 . In both cases, as t 1 (= speed camera ahead) is the less frequent state of the world, it is efficient to send a costly message only in state t 1 . In Table 11 , while it is four times less costly to do the wrong action in state t 2 than in state t 1 (i.e., it is less costly to drive slow when there is no speed camera ahead than to drive fast when there is a speed camera ahead), state t 1 is so infrequent that in a pooling PBE, R does a 2 (= drive fast). By neologism proofness and by the intuitive criterion, R realizes that only S in t 1 has an incentive to send a costly message. By attainability, in the pooling PBE where R always plans to do a 2 , an alternative best response is 29 De Jaegher et al. (2008) carry out a laboratory experiment on the costly signaling common-interest game, in which both the game in Proposition 7(i) and in (ii) is replicated in the laboratory. Participants predominantly play the efficient separating equilibrium, independent of the form of the pooling PBE. However, when sending a message is costless, the form of the pooling PBE does play a role for the kind of separating PBE that is achieved.
to do a 1 when receiving a message, so that the separating PBE can evolve through evolutionary drift. In Table 12 , state t 2 is only twice as probable as state t 1 , whereas it continues to be the case that it is four times less costly to do the wrong action in state t 2 . For this reason, in the pooling PBE, R does a 1 (= drive slow). By the same reasoning as above, the inefficient separating PBE is now predicted to be played.
t 1 (π 1 = 0.1) (1, 1) (0, 0) 0.1 t 2 (π 2 = 0.9) (0.75, 0.75) (1, 1) 0.1 Table 11 . Costly signaling common-interest model: efficient separating PBE predicted
(0.75, 0.75) (1, 1) 0.1 Table 12 .
Costly signaling common-interest model: inefficient separating PBE predicted
An example by Grice (1967) is useful to illustrate Proposition 7. Suppose that S says "Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the score of 'Home Sweet Home.' " The fact that S took the trouble sending such a long and costly message, rather than a shorter message "Miss X sang 'Home Sweet Home'" should convince R that something else is going on, namely that the singing of Miss X had some hideous effect. From a pragmatic point of view, this may be seen to illustrate the second Maxim of Quantity, Do not make your contribution more informative than is required: if S says something extra, then this should be relevant. At the same time, Horn's rule is followed, as a marked message is only sent in a marked state. Yet, following De Jaegher (2008), we note that this example relies on the assumption that without any information, R's best bet is that Miss X sang without any hideous effect. If it is very important for R not to expect that Miss X sang in a normal manner when in fact she sang with a hideous effect, then without information, R's best bet is that Miss X sang with a hideous effect, even though this is not the most likely outcome. The second Maxim of Quantity, as well as the equilibrium selection arguments applied in Proposition 7, now requires that S sends a costly message, say "Miss X sang a beautiful version of 'Home Sweet Home' ", in the frequent state of the world. But this violates Horn's rule. While Prashant Parikh (1991 Parikh ( , 2000 Parikh ( , 2001 does not consider games where it is in R's interest, in the absence of information, to bet on infrequent states, applying his argument that S and R will consider Pareto-efficient PBE as focal, Horn's rule should apply even in this case.
A further useful example is due to Parikh (1991) . Suppose that S says that "Every ten minutes, a man gets mugged in New York." Then Parikh argues that R should infer that S refers to the usual interpretation, where the utterance refers to one man or other, and not to the unusual interpretation, where the utterance refers to one and the same man. This may be seen as illustrating the first Maxim of Quantity, Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange): if S does not provide extra information, then R should conclude that the usual interpretation is inferred. Yet, even if it is unlikely that one and the same man gets mugged in New York every ten minutes, the cost to R of wrongly inferring that it concerns one man or other may be large, and without further information R's best bet may be that it still concerns one and the same man. In this case, the first Maxim of Quantity, and the equilibrium selection arguments treated in Proposition 7, predict that S would send a message "Every ten minutes, one man or other gets mugged in New York." only when not one and the same man gets mugged. As this message is longer, and can therefore be argued to be more costly to send, the obtained separating PBE is inefficient, and violates Horn's rule. However, if one accepts Parikh's argument that Pareto efficiency is focal, Horn's rule will still be applied.
Finally, it is interesting to look to what extent the results in Proposition 7 are maintained in the limit case where messages are sent without cost. With costless messages, pooling PBE also exist where messages are sent with positive probability. Still, we continue to argue that a pooling PBE where no messages are sent is a natural starting point here. The results applying the (pooling-based) intuitive criterion are no longer relevant with costless messages, as the intuitive criterion is specifically based on the cost of messages. Yet, the results applying (pooling-based) neologism proofness and attainability are equally valid here, as these are not based on the cost of messages. The analysis is then very similar to direct signaling interpreted as costless signaling with a restriction that S can only say the truth (see Section 4.1). The fact that much of the analysis in Proposition 7 extends to the case of costless signaling, illustrates that the main issue in this proposition is the precedent of what is done in the pooling PBE, and not what is efficient.
Noise
Some weeks ago, a conference organizer invited an academic as a speaker at his conference, and the academic agreed to come. The night before the conference day, the organizer realizes that he has not heard from the academic since the time she agreed to come. Even though the organizer and the academic have common interests, the organizer wonders how to interpret the academic's silence. Does this simply mean that she will show up as agreed, and would she only have sent a new message to cancel her talk due to unforeseen circumstances? Or does her silence mean that she forgot about the conference, and is it the case that if she would not have forgotten, he would have received a confirmation from her right before the conference?
An additional complication is that no matter whether the academic sends confirmation or cancelation messages, such messages may get lost. But given that any message may get lost, the organizer may consider in what circumstances it is most costly for a message to get lost. If it is costly to schedule the academic when she does not show up (so that the audience might be left waiting), but not costly to have the academic attend the conference without a time scheduled to hold her talk, it is efficient that a confirmation message is sent. In this way, the audience is never left waiting. If it is costly that the academic shows up and finds that she cannot hold her talk but not costly for the audience that her talk is scheduled but does not go through (e.g. because there are parallel sessions), it is efficient that a cancelation message is sent, when relevant. In this way, the academic can always hold her talk if she is present. In general, as silence does not lead to mistakes (an e-mail will not be received if none was sent), no message should be sent in the case where it is important not to make mistakes. While Grice does not formulate such a maxim, from the perspective of the Cooperative Principle it seems plausible that a maxim telling senders to be clear when it is important, is followed.
Noisy signaling common-interest model. In the simplest model reflecting this story, T = {t 1 , t 2 } (= respectively the academic wants to cancel, and the academic does not want to cancel), and A = {a 1 , a 2 } (= respectively her talk is canceled, and her talk is not canceled). Both S and R want the label of R's action to be the same as the label of the state of the world. S can choose a message m from a set of messages M with 0 ) ,
. The messages, which may or may not be part of a common language, all get lost with the same probability µ(m 0 |m) > 0. We only consider PBE where S either sends a message or does not. As shown in Proposition 8, if R does a 2 (= organizer does not cancel the talk) in the pooling PBE, then an efficient separating PBE exists where S sends a message in state t 1 (i.e. sends a cancelation message), and an inefficient separating PBE where S sends a message in state t 2 (i.e. sends a confirmation message). That the former PBE is efficient is intuitive: given that R does a 2 in the pooling PBE, this means that the cost of mistakenly doing a 2 in state t 1 is relatively small. For this same reason, it is better to send a noisy message in t 1 rather than in t 2 (i.e. as the cost of the academic not showing up is small, it is not that problematic that a cancelation message sometimes gets lost). Proposition 8 further shows that only the efficient separating PBE is attainable from the pooling PBE where R does a 2 in any event, and only this PBE is poolingbased neologism proof. The result that the efficient separating PBE gets selected is independent of the labels of states and messages, and is thus general for this simple model (thus, by the same reasoning, if in the pooling PBE the organizer cancels the talk, then it is efficient to send a confirmation message in the separating PBE, and this is also the separating PBE that is selected by several equilibrium selection arguments).
Proposition 8. Consider the noisy signaling common-interest model. Let a 2 be R's best response in every pooling PBE, and let each message m gets lost with probability
. Then (i) the pooling PBE where R does a 2 in any event is not neologism proof.
(ii) an efficient separating PBE exists where S sends a noisy message m only in state t 1 . This separating PBE is pooling-based neologism proof, and is attainable from the pooling PBE. (iii) an inefficient separating PBE exists where S sends a noisy message m only in state t 2 .
This separating PBE is not pooling-based neologism proof, and is not attainable from the pooling PBE.
A numerical example illustrating Proposition 8 can be found in Table 13 . Given that state t 2 (= academic does not want to cancel) is more likely, in any pooling PBE R always does a 2 (= the organizer schedules the academic's talk). In a separating PBE where the noisy message is sent in state t 1 (i.e. the academic sends a cancelation message when wanting to cancel), when R does not receive a message, the updated probability that state t 2 occurs equals
, so that R indeed prefers to do a 2 when not receiving a message (i.e. the organizer schedules the talk when not receiving a cancelation message). The players' expected payoffs in this separating PBE equal 99 .
. In a separating PBE where the noisy message is sent in state t 2 (i.e. the academic sends a confirmation message when not wanting to cancel), when not receiving a message the updated probability that state t 2 occurs equals . It follows that both players are better off in the first separating PBE, where the noisy message is sent in state t 1 (i.e. a cancelation message). But this is also the PBE that is predicted to be played by our equilibrium selection arguments, as action a 2 is done in the pooling PBE.
(1, 1) (0, 0) 0.1 t 2 (π 2 = 0.9) (0, 0) (1, 1) Table 13 .
Noisy signaling common-interest model
In terms of the example at the beginning of this section, if the key consideration is that the audience is never left waiting, then an organizer who does not receive a confirmation will not schedule the academic. This is both efficient, and it is predicted by equilibrium selection arguments. If the key consideration is that the academic does not show up to find out that no time has been scheduled for her talk, then an organizer who does not receive a confirmation will still schedule the academic. Again, this is efficient, and is predicted by equilibrium selection arguments. Even if Pareto efficiency does not serve as a focal point, efficiency is still obtained, because the form of the pooling PBE makes it easy to play the efficient separating PBE.
It is interesting to consider the following variant of the model, to highlight the difference with the analysis of costly signaling in Section 4.2, and at the same time to highlight the sensitivity of the model to the type of noise, and to whether it is noiseless or noisy messages that are not sent in the pooling PBE. Consider again Prashant Parikh's (1991) example where there are two states of the world, namely "one and the same man gets mugged in New York every ten minutes" (state t 1 ), and "one man or other gets mugged in New York every ten minutes" (state t 2 ). Let it be the case that in the pooling PBE, S always sends the message m 2 , "Every ten minutes, a man gets mugged in New York". This message is ambiguous, where we here assume that this means that with a given probability, R interprets it to refer to one and the same man, and with a complementary probability, R interprets it to refer to one or other man. Suppose that S can now either additionally send either a message m 1 "One and the same man gets mugged in New York", or a message ' 2 m "One man or other gets mugged in New York", but cannot use both these messages at the same time. Both the messages are unambiguous, in that they are never misinterpreted, i.e. 1 )
. Contrary to what is the case above, the messages that are not sent in the pooling PBE are noiseless.
A separating PBE now exists where S sends m 1 in t 1 and ' 2 m in t 2 , as well as a separating PBE where S sends m 2 in t 1 and ' 2 m in t 2 . Which of these separating PBE is efficient depends on where the costs of misinterpretation are largest. E.g., if state 1 is infrequent, then unless we assume particular payoffs, it is efficient to send m 1 in t 1 and ' 2 m in t 2 . In this manner, faulty interpretations only get made in the infrequent state and not in the frequent one. The unambiguous message is thus sent in the frequent state, contrary to what is efficient in the costly-signaling model (where ambiguous messages cause less direct costs, and can in equilibrium receive an unambiguous interpretation, in spite of their ambiguous semantic meaning). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the pooling PBE in this variant of Parikh's model is neologism proof, and that none of the separating PBE are attainable from the pooling PBE, as every message that can be received is already perceived in this PBE, so that there are no neologisms available.
Imprecision
An anti-doping agency performs doping tests on athletes, and the results of its tests can either be positive, negative, or inconclusive. The sports federation to which it reports prefers to suspend athletes with a positive test, to give athletes with an inconclusive test a warning, and to let athletes with a negative test go free. Unfortunately, the anti-doping agency can only give the sports federation two possible messages, so that inevitably one of the two possible messages of the anti-doping agency needs to cover two states. The sports federation and the anti-doping agency both hate to suspend innocent athletes, or to give them a warning. For this reason, they both prefer that athletes with an inconclusive test are not suspended, and that only athletes with a positive test are suspended. A partial separating PBE exists that achieves exactly this, where a positive test result is reported when the test was positive, and a nonpositive test result otherwise, where we assume that with the latter result the athlete goes free. Unfortunately, a partial separating PBE also exists where the anti-doping agency reports a negative doping result when the test was negative, and a non-negative test result otherwise, where we assume that the latter report results in a warning. If in a pooling PBE the agency lets all athletes go free, then any non-negative or positive report is a neologism, so that both partial separating PBE are pooling-based neologism proof. However, since both a nonnegative report and positive report is credible, the anti-doping agency can still choose the partial separating PBE which is most to its own advantage (and to the advantage of the sports federation). While Grice did not formulate such a maxim, in line with the Cooperative Principle, the sports federation may be seen to follow a maxim telling her to Be (im)precise when it is (un)important. If it is not important whether the test was inconclusive or negative, then the sports federation should not be precise about this.
A related idea is found in a recent paper by Crémer et al. (2007) , who show that it is efficient for firms to use precise, fine-tuned jargon in states of the world with which they are confronted frequently, and imprecise language in states of the world that are less frequent.
30
The argument there, however, is one of design rather than coordination between a sender and a receiver. A much more sophisticated model than ours is found in Jäger et al. (2011) , who study a common-interest signaling game with continuous states of the world defined over multiple dimensions (e.g., the location on a plane) and with a finite number of signals. While most of the analysis concerns uniform distributions (all states are equally likely) and while the focus is on the form of equilibrium partitions (Voronoi tessellations), the authors also pay attention to non-uniform distributions, where in an example it is shown to be efficient that states with a larger mass in the distribution function have smaller partitions, whereas states with less mass have larger partitions. Yet, there are also inefficient PBE, and the focus in our analysis is on whether equilibrium selection arguments select the efficient PBE.
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Imprecise signaling common-interest model. Let T = {t 1 , t 2 , t 3 } (in terms of the story, respectively a positive test, an inconclusive test, and a negative test), and A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } (= respectively suspend, give a warning, or let go free). Let M contain exactly two messages with or without common meaning, and with C(m, t) = 0, µ(m 0 |m) = 0 (note that when the message set includes the empty message, then the empty message is one of the two messages). Each player prefers that in each state, the action with the same label as the state is taken. Action a 3 (= let the athlete go free) is taken in the pooling PBE, as well as when t 2 and t 3 are pooled in a partial separating PBE. When t 1 and t 2 are pooled, action a 2 (= give the athlete a warning) is taken. Proposition 9 derives conditions so that a 3 is done in every pooling PBE, and so that both a partial separating PBE exists where states t 1 and t 2 are pooled (where in both states 30 E.g. if the distribution of a random variable follows a bell-shaped density function, and if only a limited number of messages can be used to refer to the realized value of the variable, then more messages should be used for levels around the mean, where these messages then refer to a narrow range of values; less messages should be used for ranges in the tails of the distribution, where these messages then refer to a wide range of values. 31 A different intuition for using a limited number of messages in a common interest context is found in Nowak et al. (1999) . If using more messages means using messages that lie closer to one another, and if messages that lie close to another are more often confused for one another, then it is better to use few messages. action a 2 is done), and a partial separating PBE where states t 2 and t 3 are pooled (where in both states action a 3 is done), where the latter PBE is Pareto efficient. Pooling-based neologism proofness and attainability do not select between these two PBE, as neither action a 1 nor action a 2 is taken in a pooling PBE, and as action a 3 is taken in every partial separating PBE. Yet, in the rational model, if there is a common language as S by neologism proofness knows that R will consider both a message "t 1 or t 2 occurs" (= non-negative test result), and a message "t 1 occurs" (= positive test result) as credible, S sends the message that leads to the partial separating PBE that is best to her (and to R), and so the Pareto-efficient partial separating PBE is obtained.
Proposition 9.
Consider the imprecise signaling common-interest model. Let S be constrained to use only a single message in any partial separating PBE. Let ( ) ( ) ( ) . Then (i) in every pooling PBE, R does a 3 . The pooling PBE where S never sends any messages, and where R does a 3 in any event, is not neologism proof. (ii) in the inefficient partial separating PBE, S pools states t 1 and t 2 (leading R to do a 2 ). This PBE is pooling-based neologism proof, and is attainable from the pooling PBE where S never sends any messages and where R does a 3 in any event. (iii) in the efficient partial separating PBE, S pools states t 2 and t 3 (leading R to do a 3 ). This PBE is also pooling-based neologism proof, and is also attainable from the pooling PBE where S never sends any messages and where R does a 3 in any event.
t 1 (π 1 = 1/6) (1, 1) (0, 0) (-1, -1) t 2 (π 2 = 2/6) (0, 0) (1, 1) (0.75, 0.75) t 3 (π 3 = 3/6) (-1, -1) (0, 0) (1, 1) Table 14 . Common-interest imprecise signaling model A numerical example illustrating Proposition 9 is found in Table 14 . It is clear that, when R in a pooling PBE does not receive any information, he prefers to do a 3 (i.e. the sports federation prefers to let the athlete go free). In a partial separating PBE where states t 1 and t 2 are pooled, as is clear from the payoffs, R prefers to do a 2 when receiving a message implying that state t 3 does not occur (= when the anti-doping agency reports that the athlete has a nonnegative test, the sports federation prefers to give the athlete a warning). S in state t 1 and state t 2 is better off with this response than when sending a message implying that state t 3 occurs. . It follows that the second partial separating PBE is better to both players. As action a 3 is done in the pooling PBE, our equilibrium selection arguments predict that both partial separating PBE may be played. Yet, with a common language, as R considers both a message "t 1 or t 2 " occurs, or a message "t 1 occurs" as credible, S will pick the partial separating PBE most to the advantage of S and R.
In order to again highlight the difference with the analysis of costly signaling in Section 4.2, consider the following variant of an example due to Prashant Parikh (1991) . Let there be three states of the world, namely "one and the same man gets mugged in New York every ten minutes" (state t 1 ), and "one man or other gets mugged in New York every ten minutes" (state t 2 ), and "nobody gets mugged in New York" (state t 3 ). In the pooling PBE, let R's best guess be that state t 3 occurs, e.g. because this is the most likely state. Let S have two messages available, namely m 1 : "Every ten minutes, a man gets mugged in New York", which in the common language may refer to both one or other man, and to one and the same man, and ' 1 m : "Every ten minutes, one and the same man gets mugged in New York". Then both a partial separating PBE exists where S sends m 1 in states t 1 and t 2 , and a partial separating PBE where S sends ' 1 m in state t 1 only. Given the form of the pooling PBE, if players start out with a pooling PBE where S does not send any messages and R plans to guess that state t 3 occurs in any event, then both messages m 1 and ' 1 m are credible, so that both partial separating PBE are pooling-based neologism proof. But S can then select to play the efficient partial separating PBE. For instance, it may be efficient to be precise about state t 3 , and imprecise about states t 1 and t 2 . In this case, S sends message m 1 in states t 1 and t 2 . Given that by assumption t 3 is the most likely state, in the Pareto-efficient partial separating PBE, S sends the imprecise message in the less frequent states. This contrasts with the model of costly signaling, where ambiguity was interpreted as the cost of sending a message, and where a semantically ambiguous message could still be used in an unambiguous way. In this case, the ambiguous message needs to be sent in the more frequent states.
Discussion
Under the influence of similar trends within economics, game-theoretical pragmatics is starting to move into the direction of behavioral game theory, which considers psychologically more realistic players. For instance, when receiving an unexpected message, this message may refer to a state of the world of which the receiver was unaware (Franke & De Jager, 2011) ; in standard game theory, this is simply not possible. While we consider it obvious that this is the direction for game-theoretic pragmatics to take, our main focus in the current paper has consciously been on the rational approach.
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The point we want to make by this focus is that a large number of issues remain to be explored in the rational approach. Exploring these issues is important, because we need the benchmark of rational models to better explore the impact of switching to behavioral models; by switching to behavioral game theory, perhaps we are trying to run before we can walk. We now list several voids to be explored in the rational approach.
In the simple models we have treated, we have tried to select among the multiple equilibria by employing several equilibrium selection arguments. The common principle of these arguments is that, when receiving a message or extra message, the receiver infers what the sender intends by sending this message from the fact that the sender could also not have sent a message or extra message. Yet, our models include cases where this principle predicts play of an inefficient equilibrium. E.g., if payoffs are such that the informed receiver prefers to guess that the infrequent state occurs, then the principle predicts that the sender will inefficiently send a costly message in the frequent state. The question arising then is whether the efficient equilibrium where a costly message is sent in the infrequent state is still salient to the players.
Further, in order to provide a unified framework, we have focused on signaling games with only two or three states of the world. The question then arises to what extent our analysis applies in the more realistic case of multiple states of the world. For instance, in Milgrom's (1981) model of direct signaling with a continuum of states of the world, obfuscation as we obtained in Section 3.1 is not possible, as in the pooling equilibrium it is then never the case that the receiver takes the action most preferred to the sender, so that there are always some senders who are better off by revealing their information. On the other hand, in our simple framework, the sender saying something rather than nothing often leads straight to the play of the most informative equilibrium, whereas with a continuum of states this will not be the case; the question is then whether the most informative equilibrium is still played. In part, the limitation of a few states of the world is a problem of this paper rather than of the signaling literature. Yet, continuous versions of the models introduced in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 on noisy and imprecise signaling with common interests remain unexplored.
Moreover, we have only considered signaling about a single range of states of the world, and not about multiple ranges of state of the world, i.e. multidimensional signaling. Such multidimensional signaling is treated in Battaglini (2002) , and in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) , and deserves attention in game-theoretic pragmatics. The same is true for models of signal exchanges, where the receiver talks back (see De Jaegher (2006 , 2008b ).
Finally, we have treated direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signaling as completely separate classes. Yet, any message may at the same time be costly, noisy and imprecise, and have aspects of direct signaling. Further, these aspects of signaling interact. E.g., it may be more costly to send less noisy messages, and sending more precise messages, which therefore lie closer to one another, may lead to increased noise, in that messages are more often confused for one another. Future analysis needs to address such issues.
Appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) -(ii) In a pooling PBE where R always does a 1 (a 2 ), S in state t 2 (t 1 ) can only send m 0 .
Given the condition on R's payoffs, if S in state t 1 (t 2 ) sends m 1 (m 2 ) with sufficiently low probability, R will continue to always do a 1 (a 2 ). A pooling PBE where R always does a 2 can only be maintained if R believes that m 1 comes from t 2 . Yet, as soon as m 1 is sent with small probability, such beliefs cannot be maintained. It follows that such a pooling PBE is not a sequential equilibrium. A pooling PBE where R always does a 1 can be maintained if R believes that m 1 (m 2 ) comes from t 1 (t 2 ). This is therefore a sequential equilibrium. (iii) Let R do a 1 when receiving m 0 . Then S sends m 0 in t 2 , and we cannot have a separating PBE. It follows that in any separating PBE, if m 0 is sent, it can only be followed by a 2 . In turn, it follows that S in t 1 always sends m 1 in a separating PBE. S in t 2 may mix in any sort of way between sending m 0 and m 2 . Further, in a pooling PBE as under (ii), an alternative best response for R to S's strategy is to do a 1 (a 2 ) upon m 1 (m 2 ), and a 2 upon m 0 , which is in line with R's best response in the separating PBE. It follows that separating PBE are attainable from the pooling PBE under (ii). Finally, in a pooling PBE as under (i), given that a 1 is done upon m 0 , no separating PBE is attainable from this pooling PBE. QED
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let S send a message 1 i m for whatever cue i takes on a value of 1. Then R prefers to do a 2 given that ( ) (
, , 
Proof of Proposition 3:
If S plays the strategy of the specified candidate separating PBE, it is a best response for R to do a 1 when receiving message m, and to do a 2 otherwise. If R plays the strategy of the specified candidate separating PBE, it is a best response for S to send message m in state t 1 and not to send m 0 in state t 2 iff
. The conditions follow. Under (i), the pooling PBE is neologism proof and meets the intuitive criterion because S in t 1 already obtains her most preferred response a 1 without sending a message. For the same reason, while sending a message is dominated to S in t 2 , the pooling PBE survives dominance.
Under (ii), the pooling PBE is not neologism proof, does not meet the intuitive criterion, and is eliminated by dominance. Only S in t 1 benefits from deviating from the pooling PBE by sending m; moreover, sending m rather than m 0 is dominated for S in t 2 . The results on attainability and on pooling-based neologism proofness and pooling-based intuitive criterion now follow straightforwardly. QED
Proof of Proposition 4:
We first show that under the given condition, the pooling PBE takes on the form given under (i). 
Combining (6) and (7), the condition for R's utility function stated in the proposition is obtained. The pooling PBE where R does a 3 in any event is neologism proof: S in both states of the world prefers to send any message m 1 that leads R to do a 1 with positive probability, rather than to send message m 0 .
We now show the existence of the separating PBE in (ii). When not receiving any signal, R should prefer to do a 3 to a 1 : 
where the right-hand side in (9) is smaller than 1. It follows from (9) ( ) ( ) 
where the left-hand side in (11) is larger than 1. By (8) and (10) In (16), the right-hand side is smaller than 1; in (17), the left-hand side is also smaller than 1. From the latter, it follows that in any separating PBE, it must be the case that (16) and (17) 
−
. Therefore, under the conditions specified in the proposition, levels of (9), (11), (16) and (17) are valid, so that a separating PBE exists.
The fact that there is a unique Pareto-efficient separating PBE with minimal noise can be seen by plotting (9), (11), (16) and (17) , when S in a candidate partial separating PBE pools t 2 and t 1 , R does a 1 . It follows that S in state t 1 and t 2 does not want to send the message inducing a 3 . At the same time, S in t 3 does not want to send the message that is sent in both states t 2 and t 1 , as S in t 3 prefers action a 3 to action a 1 .
(ii) Pooling PBE are not neologism proof, whatever the form they take. If a 3 is R's best response in the pooling PBE, consider a neologism "t 3 does not occur". Following equation (1) 
<
, S in states t 2 and t 1 does prefer to send such a message if it is considered truthful. A partial separating PBE is attainable from each of the given pooling PBE, as evolutionary drift can always lead R to plan to do a 3 when receiving one out-ofequilibrium message, and a 1 when receiving another out-of-equilibrium message. QED
Proof of Proposition 6:
For proving the existence of the pooling PBE under (i) and (ii), see the proof of Proposition 2. We next prove the existence of the separating PBE in (iii). If R believes that a single revealed "1" means that both cues have a value of 1, then given common interests S follows the candidate equilibrium strategy. This in turn makes it a best response for R to follow the candidate equilibrium strategy. The same applies to the other separating PBE.
The pooling PBE in (i) is a sequential equilibrium, because a single revealed cue "1" can also be revealed by S in state (1, 2) or (2, 1). The pooling PBE in (ii) is not a sequential equilibrium, because a single revealed "2" can only be revealed in states (1, 2), (2, 1) or (2, 2).
The separating PBE where S reveals a "1" if both of the cues have a value of 1, and does not reveal anything otherwise, is attainable from the pooling PBE under (i) (conditional on , then in pooling PBE a 1 is always done. If S sends a message in state t 1 (t 2 ), then it is a best response for R to take action a 1 (a 2 ) when a message is received, and to take action a 2 (a 1 ) when no message is not received. This response by R in turn makes the specified strategy by S a best response. For R, it does not matter which separating PBE is played. S is better off if the message is only sent infrequently. Consider the case where in the pooling PBE, a 2 (respectively a 1 ) is always done. If the messages are from a common language, given that players have common interests, the PBE is not neologism proof, since only R in state t 1 (respectively t 2 ) has an incentive to send a message with common meaning "do a 1 " (respectively "do a 2 "), if S expects that R will act on the literal meaning of this message. For this reason, only the efficient separating PBE (respectively inefficient separating PBE) is pooling-based neologism proof. If the messages are not from a common language, in the pooling PBE, it is equilibrium dominated for S to send a costly message in state t 2 (respectively t 1 ). The pooling PBE therefore does not meet the intuitive criterion, as R should always interpret that a costly message came from S in state t 1 (respectively t 1 ). For this reason, only the efficient separating PBE (respectively inefficient separating PBE) meets the pooling-based intuitive criterion. Finally, in the pooling PBE, it is an alternative best response for R to plan to do a 2 (respectively a 1 ) when not receiving a message, and plan to do a 1 (respectively a 2 ) when receiving a message. It follows that only the efficient separating PBE (respectively inefficient separating PBE) is attainable from the pooling PBE. QED
Proof of Proposition 8:
As by assumption a message can only be received if it was sent, the constraint determining the existence of a separating PBE is what R does when not receiving a message. In the separating PBE where a message is sent in state t 1 , R strictly prefers to do a 2 when not receiving a message iff
